Interesting analysis of the feasibility of militarily re-opening the Strait of Hormuz

[pat_k]

March 17, 2026
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies
The Strait of Hormuz: Global Economic Shock and the Limits of Military Power
https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/strait-hormuz-global-economic-shock-and-limits-military-power

This paper aims to briefly examine the global importance of the Strait of Hormuz, assess potential US measures, and evaluate Iran’s likely responses.

It's a very detailed analysis -- a lot over my head -- but it gave me a better sense of the situation. The conclusion:

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz may be militarily possible, but it would likely be costly and time-consuming for the United States. Even attempting it could trigger a global economic shock. Persistent threats to shipping could take weeks or months to suppress, making long-term control impractical.

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How the United States intends to navigate this delicate balance remains unclear, but the Strait of Hormuz is undoubtedly one of the most discussed topics at United States Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters. The main question is whether, given the resources and capabilities at CENTCOM’s disposal, conducting a military operation to reopen the strait would be strategically and economically viable.

The answer is that such an operation would follow a general framework: intensive and targeted bombardment of coastal areas, maximised suppression of mobile missile launchers using existing capabilities, and, ultimately, naval escort of vessels toward a secure corridor.

According to the latest update released by CENTCOM on Operation “Epic Fury”, approximately 6,000 targets across Iran have been struck since the operation commenced on 28 February 2026, and such attacks are likely to continue. Nevertheless, as observed in recent days, Iran continues to launch ballistic and cruise missiles. Additionally, suicide drones remain a significant challenge.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the United States’s priority would be the complete neutralisation of Iran’s ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles and suicide drone capabilities. Suppressing the launch and use of suicide drones is expected to be even more difficult than countering cruise and ballistic missiles. In general, identifying mobile launchers is one of the most challenging intelligence tasks on the battlefield.

To locate such targets, the United States employs an extensive network of intelligence and reconnaissance assets. At the core of this network are US Space Force reconnaissance satellites, including radar, optical and infrared platforms. Complementing these are electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) satellites and aircraft, as well as reconnaissance drones operated by the US Air Force and Navy, all of which play a critical role in target identification.

In addition to space-based systems, ground-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) assets also play a significant role. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was deeply concerned about the National Security Agency’s ability to track and identify its missile launchers. The agency could intercept electronic signals emitted by Soviet launchers, providing valuable intelligence in the process.

The first step in any operation would involve targeted strikes against known coastal installations. One of the key assets available to CENTCOM is the US Air Force’s bomber fleet. Currently, several B-52H and B-1B strategic bombers are deployed in Europe and actively participating in strikes against Iran. There is also reason to believe that a number of B-2A stealth strategic bombers have been involved, operating from US territory or from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. However, these bombers cannot identify targets on their own; continuous intelligence support is essential. Moreover, given the operational turnaround time between sorties, complementary measures are required to maintain sustained pressure.

In such a scenario, should the United States decide to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, we would likely see the deployment of US Army multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to fire short-range ballistic missiles from bases in Bahrain and possibly the United Arab Emirates against coastal targets in Iran. These targets could also include positions on Iranian islands in the Gulf.
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Geography vs. Military Power

At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 39 kilometres wide, yet the navigable channel for ultra-large crude carriers (VLCCs) is far narrower. The strait consists of two 3.7-kilometer lanes for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by a buffer zone. Together, this 11-kilometer corridor underpins the global energy economy and lies close to Iran’s coastline, enabling the Iranian military to monitor all vessel movements with precision.

Iran’s control over the strait is not merely a function of military hardware; geographic advantage plays a decisive role. With the longest coastline along the northern side of the strait and strategic control over islands including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, Lark, Qeshm and Hormuz, Iran can assert both power and oversight over maritime traffic. This geographic advantage, combined with an asymmetric military doctrine, provides Tehran with a potent strategic tool. These islands host both defensive and offensive systems, including anti-ship cruise missile launchers and suicide drones.
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[Historic NY]

1. It not going to be easy

meanwhile Iran is replenishing its drone stocks.